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Abstract
This paper shows that favorable public information ahead of the IPO reduces investor
heterogeneity and hence reduces the adverse selection problem facing lesser-informed
investors, and that this induces the issuer to price the issue more conservatively in the
sense of pricing it so that the quality of the marginal investor is lower. As a result,
initial returns may be higher in issues preceded by favorable public information than in
issues preceded by unfavorable information. This implication is consistent with empirical
evidence that issuers only partially incorporate public information into the IPO price.
The model is also consistent with recent empirical evidence of zero excess returns to
uninformed investors in issues preceded by favorable public information and negative
excess returns in issues preceded by unfavorable public information.
JEL Classification: G10, G32.
1 Introduction
Empirical evidence on underpricing in initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) shows that initial re-
turns are higher in issues preceded by favorable public information than in issues preceded
by unfavorable information, suggesting that issuers fail to fully adjust IPO prices to publicly
available information.1 The present paper oﬀers an explanation for this evidence based on
∗I thank Yakov Amihud, Hans K. Hvide, and Øyvind Norli for comments. Any remaining errors and
omissions are mine.
†Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Admin-
istration (NHH), Helleveien 30, 5045 Bergen, Norway. Email: tore.leite@nhh.no.
1See Logue (1973), Loughran and Ritter (2002), Bradley and Jordan (2002), Lowry and Schwert (2003),
Amihud, Hauser, and Kirsh (2003), Edelen and Kadlec (2003), and Derrien and Womack (2003).
1
the adverse selection argument of Rock (1986), which explains IPO underpricing as a com-
pensation to uninformed investors for being allocated a disproportionately large fraction of
overpriced issues.
The argument goes as follows. The issuer prices the issue to maximize expected proceeds,
facing a pool of heterogeneously informed investors. A lower price induces investors with less
precise private information to submit bids in the oﬀering. This implies that a lower price de-
creases the quality of the marginal investor, but increases the set of investors who potentially
submit bids in the oﬀering, and hence increases the probability that the oﬀering will succeed.
Favorable public information reduces diﬀerences in reservation values among investors who
hold favorable private information about the IPO firm, which defines the set of investors who
potentially submit bids in the oﬀering. As a result, investors are less heterogeneous–and
hence adverse selection is less pervasive–in issues preceded by favorable public information
compared to issues preceded by unfavorable public information (all else the same). Less in-
vestor heterogeneity induces the issuer to price the issue more conservatively in the sense of
pricing it so that investors with less precise information will find it optimal to ask for alloca-
tions. The model thus predicts that the quality of the marginal investor will be lower–and
hence that initial returns may be higher–in issues preceded by favorable information than in
issues preceded by unfavorable information, which is consistent with the evidence of partial
adjustment to public information.
Loughran and Ritter (2002) explain the evidence on partial adjustment to public infor-
mation using prospect theory, which implies that the issuer cares about the change in wealth
rather than its level. Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2003) and Derrien (2003) oﬀer expla-
nations based on the presence of sentiment investors to understand short-term underpricing
and long-term overpricing. Although the present model assumes rational investors, the public
signal may be viewed as sentiment and thus a rational investor calculating expectations over
allocations and short-term returns must take into account the role of sentiment in aftermar-
ket prices of IPO shares. In other words, there is no inconsistency between adverse selection
as a source of short-term underpricing and sentiment as a cause of long-term overpricing.
Edelen and Kadlec (2003) develop a model in which the issuer’s potential surplus from going
public is increasing in market valuations observed prior to the IPO. The issuer maximizing
the expected surplus in the oﬀering trades oﬀ the probability of issue success against the
size of the surplus, and end up not adjusting fully to increases in market valuations. In
the present paper, favorable public information (which may be viewed a favorable market
sentiment consistent with Ljungqvist et al.) reduces the degree of investor heterogeneity in
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the pool of potential bidders. This induces the issuer to price the issue towards a higher
probability of success, and potentially a higher initial return.
The main empirical implication of the basic adverse selection argument is that excess
returns to uninformed investors will be zero once the probability of being allocated shares is
taken into account. The present model suggests that the marginal investor may be informed,
and this implies that the expected excess return to uninformed participation must be negative.
Furthermore, if the marginal investor in issues preceded by unfavorable public information
is better informed than the marginal investor in issues preceded by favorable information,
then the expected loss to uninformed participation in issues preceded by unfavorable public
information will be greater than that in issues preceded by favorable public information. This
prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence of Amihud, Hauser, and Kirsh (2003) who
document zero excess returns on a strategy of submitting bids in issues preceded by favorable
market information, and negative excess returns on submitting bids in IPOs preceded by
unfavorable market information in a sample of IPOs from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. In
other words, the present paper suggests that evidence of Amihud et al.(2003) is consistent
with the Rock explanation for underpricing, which is in contrast to their conclusion that their
results “cast doubt on Rock’s (1986) explanation of underpricing.”
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in Section 2.
Section 3 examines how public information relates to underpricing. Section 4 discusses the
results. Section 5 concludes the paper. All proofs in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider the following two period setting. A firm is sold in an Initial Public Oﬀering (IPO)
on date zero, and a market value of this firm is established on date one. The true value of
the firm is denoted v, where v = vH with probability α, v = vL with probability 1− α, and
vH > vL = 0. Its expected value is thus E(v) := αvH . All agents are risk neutral, and the
riskless interest rate is zero.
There are N ≥ 2 investors in the oﬀering. Each investor n observes a private signal
sn ∈ Sn = {bn, gn}, where sn = gn (sn = bn) represents favorable (unfavorable) information.
The precision in sn is given by γn := p(gn|vH) = p(bn|vL) ≥ 1/2.2 A key aspect of the model
is that investors diﬀer in the precision of their signals, which is captured by the ordering
2Let p(x|y) denote the conditional probability of x given y. Furthermore, let p(x) denote unconditional
probability, and p(x, y) and p(x, y, z) joint probabilities.
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γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ · · · ≤ γN . In addition to the private signal, each investor (along with the issuer)
observes a public signal s ∈ S = {b, g}, which has precision γ := p(g|vH) = p(b|vL). The
public signal is revealed before the issuer sets the IPO price.
The public signal may be correlated with market wide information, it may be firm specific,
or it may be a combination. In the first case, the public signal is given by market returns
observed prior to the issue. As such, the public signal may represent investor sentiment
which in the short-term will aﬀect the market value of IPO shares. In other words, the
present model is consistent with that of Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2003), who study the
eﬀect of investor sentiment on short-term and long-term IPO returns.
Let V sn denote the reservation value of investor n as a function of the public signal s. Let
P0 denote the IPO price. By definition, an investor n will not request shares in the oﬀering
unless his reservation value exceeds the IPO price; that is, unless V sn ≥ P0. The reservation
value V sn of investor n is a function of the realization of his private signal, and is higher if the
private signal is favorable. The issuer is unable to observe the private signals observed by
investors, but will price the issue so that an investor will request shares in the oﬀering only
if his signal is favorable.3 This implies that relevant reservation values from the viewpoint
of the issuer are investors’ reservation values given favorable private information. Unless
otherwise stated, I will let V sn denote the reservation value of investor n based on sn = gn.
Thus, given γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ · · · ≤ γN , reservation values are ordered V s1 ≤ V s2 ≤ · · · ≤ V sN . I
will refer to an investor with more precise information as a higher quality investor. A higher
quality investor has a higher reservation value in the oﬀering since he expects to be allocated
a higher fraction of underpriced issues than a lower quality investor.4
Let m ∈ [1, . . . , N ] index the marginal investor in the oﬀering. The pool of IPO investors
may be partitioned into sets B = [m,N ] and Bc = [1,m), where B represents the set of
investors for which V sn ≥ V sm. Among the investors in the set B only those with favorable
3This is an implicit assumption on the precision in the private signals observed by investors. Specifically,
if the precision in the signal observed by investor n = 1 is suﬃciently low, and the precision in the signals
observed by investors n > 1 is not too high, then it may be optimal for the issuer to price the issue so that
investor n = 1 will submit a bid in the oﬀering regardless of his signal. In this case, the marginal investor is
eﬀectively uninformed since his bid strategy is independent of his signal. It will never be optimal, however, to
price the issue so that any investor n > 1 ignores his signal.
4With no loss in insight, the private signals are assumed to be costless. The idea is that the issuer,
facing a pool of heterogeneously informed investors at the pricing stage, prices the issue to maximize expected
proceeds. The cost of becoming informed will aﬀect the size of the investor pool at the pricing stage, as will
the issuer’s pricing strategy, which in turn is aﬀected by the degree of investor heterogeneity and the size
of the investor pool. It may be shown that the necessary conditions for equilibrium are (i) that the relative
ranking of investors in terms of signal precision is uncertain at the information acquisition stage, and (i) the
cost of acquiring information are not too high.
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signals will ask for allocations. Investors in the set Bc do not submit bids in the oﬀering
regardless of the precision in their signals. The identity of the marginal investor will be a
function of the public signal. This is captured by letting m = m(s).
A higher issue price implies higher proceeds if the oﬀering succeeds, but it also implies a
reduction in the set B of potential bidders, and hence a lower probability that the oﬀering
will succeed. Also, a higher IPO price implies an increase in the quality of the marginal
investor.
It is assumed that the issuer sells the entire firm in the oﬀering. The number of shares
that is issued is normalized to one, and allocations are pro-rata. Each investor requests either
one share in the oﬀering, or none. If no bids are submitted, then no shares are allocated and
the issue is withdrawn.5
Let #g denote the number of investors who submit bids in the oﬀering. This is a random
variable with support [0, . . . , N −m]. The issue is allocated pro-rata, and thus each bidder
is allocated a fraction #g−1of the issue. The aftermarket value of the IPO firm is denoted
v(s1, . . . , sN , s), which represents the expected true value of the firm as a function of the
private signals observed by investors as well as the public signal. This implicitly assumes
that the private signals of investors are revealed once shares start trading in the aftermarket.
To determine whether the issue is underpriced or not, we need a benchmark against which
to compare the IPO price. A natural candidate is the expected aftermarket value of the IPO
firm, as given by
v0 =
P
S1×···\{bm,...,bN} p(s1, . . . , sN , s)v(s1, . . . , sN , s)P
S1×···\{bm,...,bN} p(s1, . . . , sN , s)
, (1)
where the expectation is taken over all states for which the issue succeeds. Empirically, v0
corresponds to the average aftermarket value of completed issues.
It will be helpful to use the following alternative specification of v0:
v =
P
Sm×···\{bm,...,bN} p(sm, . . . , sN , s)v(sm, . . . , sN , s)P
Sm×···\{bm,...,bN} p(sm, . . . , sN , s)
(2)
The diﬀerence between v0 and v is that the latter does not explicitly take into account signals
observed by investors in the set Bc. However, the two expressions for expected aftermarket
5 IPOs do fail. Dunbar (1996) finds a failure rate for best-eﬀort (fixed-price) oﬀerings as high as 32.5%.
For bookbuilt IPOs, Benveniste, Busaba, and Gou (2001) find failure rates to be suﬃciently high to aﬀect the
signs as well as the significance of their parameter estimates.
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value are equivalent, as shown next.
Lemma 1 v = v0
Although the information observed by investors in the set Bc does aﬀect the realization of
the firm’s aftermarket value, these investors do not submit bids in the oﬀering and hence they
do not aﬀect the outcome of the IPO. As a result, their information will not aﬀect expected
aftermarket value.
The IPO is said to be underpriced if v ≥ P0, which says that the issue is underpriced if it
is priced below its expected market value. This closely correspond to the empirical definition
of underpricing. The excess initial return is defined by rs := v/P0 − 1; s ∈ {b, g}, and thus
underpricing is associated with a positive excess initial return.
As noted, an investor n ∈ B will submit a bid in the oﬀering only if his signal is favorable.
By definition, the reservation value V sn of such an investor exceeds the IPO price P0. For
the marginal investor it is the case that V sm = P0. The expected pay-oﬀ to investor n given
sn = gn equals
EV sn =
X
Sm···×SN\Sn
p(sm, . . . , sN |gn, s)#g−1[v(sm, . . . , gn, . . . , sN , s)− P0] (3)
The reservation value V sn of investor n is the IPO price for which EV sn = 0.6 Solving for
P0 = V sn with EV sn = 0, we have
V sn = Σsnv/Σsn, (4)
where
Σsn :=
X
Sm···×SN\Sn
p(sm, . . . , sN |gn, s)#g−1, (5)
and
Σsnv :=
X
Sm···×SN\Sn
p(sm, . . . , sN |gn, s)#g−1v(sm, . . . , gn, . . . , sN , s). (6)
In other words, the reservation value V sn of investor n may be expressed as an allocation-
weighted expectation over aftermarket values, where the expectation is taken with respect to
the allocation-weighted probability distribution of investor n, conditioned on the probability
6 In analogy with Lemma 1, investors in the set Bc has no eﬀect on EVn since they do not submit bids,
and hence have no eﬀect on allocation probabilities.
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Σsn of receiving an allocation. The expression for the reservation value of the marginal investor
is given analogously. By definition, P0 = V sm, while V sn ≥ P0 for n ≥ m.
Proposition 1 (Underpricing) V sm ≤ v, where the inequality is strict if V sn < V sn+1 for at
least one n, n+ 1 ∈ B
By definition, the IPO price is equal to the reservation value of the marginal investor.
An investor with less precise information than that of the marginal investor will refrain from
asking for an allocation, and obtains a zero payoﬀ in the oﬀering. An investor with more
precise information compared to the marginal investor will ask for shares if his signal is
favorable, and will expect a positive payoﬀ. Empirically, this positive expected payoﬀ is
observed as underpricing.
3 Public Information and Underpricing
The issuer chooses the IPO price to maximize expected proceeds, which are given by:
E(R|s,m) := P0Σ(s,m) = V smΣ(s,m), (7)
where Σ(s,m) := Σsm+· · ·+ΣsN represents the probability that the oﬀering will succeed. This
assumes that the value of the firm is zero if the oﬀering fails. This is an extreme assumption,
but it has no eﬀect on the basic trade-oﬀ facing the issuer, and it has no eﬀect on any of the
results.
The IPO price implicitly defines the quality of the marginal investor. A lower IPO price
decreases the quality of the marginal investor and increases the set of investors who potentially
submit bids in the oﬀering. A lower IPO price increases expected proceeds as long as the
resulting increase in the success probability of the issue is suﬃcient to compensate for the
lower price. A key insight of the model is that the public signal will aﬀect this trade-oﬀ, and
thus indirectly aﬀect the initial return.
As a benchmark case, Proposition 2 examines the initial return rs as a function of the
public signal under the assumption that the quality of the marginal investor does not depend
on the public signal.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the issue be priced so that quality of the marginal investor does
not depend on the public signal, then the initial return will be higher in issues preceded by
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unfavorable public information than in issues preceded by favorable public information; i.e.
rb > rg
Thus, when the quality of the marginal investor is independent of the public signal,
initial returns are lower in issues preceded by favorable public information than in issues
preceded by unfavorable information. The reason is that investors (in the relevant set) are
less heterogeneous, and hence adverse selection is less pervasive, when the public signal is
favorable. To understand this result observe that the initial return given the public signal
may be expressed as follows
rs = Σ0sN−1 + (1− Σ0sN−1)
V sN
V sN−1
− 1, (8)
where Σ0sN−1 =
Σ0sN−1
Σ0sN−1+Σ0sN
and where investor N − 1 is the marginal investor. Recalling that
the firm’s expected aftermarket value v may be represented as a weighted average of investors’
reservation values, Σ0sN−1represents the weight of the reservation value of investor N − 1.
It may be shown that
V bN
V bN−1
≥ V
g
N
V gN−1
, (9)
which says that the relative diﬀerence between investors’ reservation values is less after favor-
able public information compared to unfavorable information.7 In other words, investors are
less heterogeneous, and hence adverse selection is less pervasive, if the issue is preceded by
favorable public information than if it is preceded by unfavorable information.8 A reduction
in the adverse selection problem facing less-informed investors allows the issuer to optimally
price the issue to induce investors with less precise signals to submit bids in it. The impli-
cation is that the expected initial return may be higher when the public signal is favorable
than when it is unfavorable. This is demonstrated next.
7Alternatively, condition (9) may be expressed
V bN
V
g
N
≥ V
b
N−1
V
g
N−1
,
which says that the reservation value of the better-informed investor is less aﬀected by the public signal than
the reservation value of the (lesser-informed) marginal investor.
8An investor who obtains an unfavorable private signal will refrain from submitting a bid. In the subset of
investors with favorable signals, favorable public information will reduce investor heterogeneity, while unfavor-
able public information will increase it. In the subset of investors with unfavorable private signals, favorable
public information will increase investor heterogeneity, while unfavorable public information will reduce it.
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Figure 1: The change ∆s in expected proceeds from pricing the issue to investor N − 1 as
the marginal investor m rather than investor N − 2 as a function of the precision γ in the
public signal. If ∆s > 0, then m = N − 1, and if ∆s < 0, then N − 2.
Consider the case in which m ∈ {N−2, N−1}.9 Given the public signal, the issuer prices
the issue to maximize expected proceeds Σ(s,m)V sm. Consider the diﬀerence
∆s = Σ(s,N − 1)V sN−1 − Σ(s,N − 2)V sN−2 (10)
If ∆s > 0, then pricing the issue with investor N−1 as the marginal investor represents higher
expected proceeds than pricing it with investor N − 2 as the marginal investor. Otherwise,
the issue is priced with investor N − 1 as the marginal investor. Thus, if ∆s > 0, then
P0 = V sN−1, and if ∆s < 0, then P0 = V sN−2.
Favorable public information implies a reduction in investor heterogeneity and therefore
a reduction in the adverse selection problem facing less-informed investors, which induces
the issuer the price the issue towards less-informed investors. This is illustrated in Figure 1,
which depicts ∆s as a function of the precision in the public signal for low-risk (high-α) firms
and high-risk (low-α).
In the low-risk (high-α) case, when s = g adverse selection is modest and the issuer
maximizing expected proceeds prices the issue at V gN−2 regardless of the precision in the
public signal. For s = b, if the precision in the public signal is suﬃciently low, then ∆s < 0
and the issue is priced at V gN−2. An increase in the precision in the public signal increases
investor heterogeneity. At some point ∆s > 0, and the issue is priced at V bN−1 rather than
9By Lemma 1, we may ignore investors with information quality less than that of the marginal investor.
Still, the general case for which m < N −2 becomes needlessly complex and the basic tradeoﬀs can be studied
in a less complex setting with m ≥ N − 2. Note also that by ignoring the possibility that m = N makes the
analysis more accessible, but it has no eﬀect on the analysis. Indeed, in the numerical examples depicted it is
never optimal for the issuer to price the issue with investor N as the marginal investor.
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V bN−2.
In the high-risk (low-α) case, for s = b the issue is priced at V bN−1 regardless of the
precision in the public signal. For s = g, investor heterogeneity is decreasing in the precision
in the public signal, and thus for suﬃciently high precision the issue is priced at V gN−1 rather
than V gN−2.
When the issue is priced such that the quality of the marginal investor is independent of
the public signal, Proposition 2 implies that initial returns will be higher when the public
signal is unfavorable than when it is favorable. These are the cases in Figure 1 for which
γ ≤ γ∗. In the low-risk case, the issue is priced with investor N − 2 as the marginal investor,
and investor N − 1 in the high-risk case.
When γ > γ∗ the issue is priced to investor N − 1 as the marginal investor if s = g, and
to investor N − 2 as the marginal investor if s = b. In this case, since the quality of the
marginal investor is lower when the public signal is favorable than when it is unfavorable, a
favorable public signal may give a higher initial return than an unfavorable signal.
This prediction is generated in Table 1. When the public signal is favorable (s = g), the
issue is priced optimally to investor N − 2 as the marginal investor. This gives expected
proceeds of .91 and an initial return of 10.55%. The alternative is to price the issue to
investor N −1 as the marginal investor. However, although this implies a lower initial return
(of 4.32%), it implies lower expected proceeds and is therefore not optimal. When the public
signal is unfavorable (s = b), the issue is priced optimally with investor N−1 as the marginal
investor. This implies expected proceeds of .79 and an initial return of 5.93%. The alternative
is to price the issue with investor N−2 as the marginal investor. However, this gives expected
proceeds of .78 and hence is not optimal.10
Let E(v|s) denote the expected value of the IPO firm as a function of the public signal.
In a first-best world, the issuer will be able to raise an amount equal to E(v|s). In a first-
best world, investors are uninformed, the issuer prices the issue at E(v|s), and the issue
succeeds with probability one. Actual proceeds, on the other hand, are given by E(Rm(s)|s) =
Σ(s,m)V sm(s). Thus the total loss to the issuer, normalized by the first-best amount, is given
10Holding the quality of the marginal investor constant it may be shown that higher ex ante uncertainty
increases adverse selection and hence increases the initial return, consistent with Beatty and Ritter (1986).
However, a negative correlation between ex ante uncertainty and initial returns may obtain as well when
allowing the issuer to price the issue optimally to maximize expected proceeds, suggesting that the adverse
selection argument need not imply a positive correlation between ex ante uncertainty and initial returns.
Although the empirical evidence does support a positive correlation, some of this evidence is weak, and some
of it is even contrary to the standard prediction (see Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) for a summary). In
addition, ex ante uncertainty is not directly observable and must therefore be estimated from proxies.
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m s = g V gm Σ(g,m) E(R|g) rg s = b V bm Σ(b,m) E(R|b) rb
N − 2 1.01 .90 .91 10.55 .88 .88 .78 14.22
N − 1 1.12 .80 .89 4.32 1.01 .78 .79 5.93
Table 1: The table shows the optimal choice of the issuer and the associated initial return rs
for γ = 0.55, α = 0.7, E(v) = 1, γN−2 = 0.55, γN−1 = 0.625, and γN = 0.70.
by:
Ms(m) :=
E(v|s)−E(Rm(s)|s)
E(v|s) .
This amount is increasing in investor heterogeneity since expected proceeds E(Rm|s) are
decreasing in investor heterogeneity. The next result considers the eﬀect on Ms of the public
signal.
Proposition 3 Mg < Mb
Proposition 3 says that expected proceeds to the issuer are closer to first-best in issues
preceded favorable public information than in issues preceded by unfavorable public infor-
mation. The reason is that favorable public information reduces investor heterogeneity. This
reduces the adverse selection problem facing less-informed investors, and in turn reduces the
wedge between expected proceeds and first-best. The proposition holds even if the quality
of the marginal investor is independent of the public signal. If the issuer, in maximizing
expected proceeds, prices the issue to a lower quality investor after a favorable public signal,
then expected proceeds increase and the cost of going public decreases. Yet, the initial return
increases.
The public signal aﬀects expected proceeds in the oﬀering in two ways. A favorable signal
increases the expected value of the firm, and it decreases adverse selection by reducing the
extent of investor heterogeneity. Both eﬀects increase expected proceeds and hence make it
more desirable for the firm to go public. The fact that investor heterogeneity and adverse
selection costs are negatively correlated with the public signal implies that the number of
firms coming to the market in periods of favorable public information will be excessively
large relative to what one would predict from fundamental values, and that the number of
firms coming to the market in periods of unfavorable public information will be excessively
small. This implication is consistent with observations of hot issue periods (Ibbotson and
Jaﬀe (1975) and Ritter (1984)).
Consider the numerical example from Table 1. First-best as a function of the public signal
is given by E(v|g) = 1.06 and E(v|b) = 0.94. The expected loss relative to first-best equals
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Mg = 13.96% and Mb = 15.73%. The initial return, however, is given by 10.55% when the
public signal is favorable and 5.93% when the public signal is unfavorable. In other words,
the initial return is inversely related to the cost of going public, suggesting that the initial
return may be a misleading measure of the cost of going public. This result is related to
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) who suggest that issuers balance the amount of underpricing
against direct costs of going public, and thus that issuers who float a smaller fraction of the
firm will care less about underpricing. In the present setting, although a positive expected
excess return reflects the presence of adverse selection, and hence reflects an indirect cost
of going public, the issuer prices the issue to maximize expected proceeds and its expected
initial return is only of indirect relevance.
The expected initial return rs does not coincide with the (normalized) loss associated with
adverse selection, given by Ms(m). One reason for this is that the initial return implicitly
normalizes the total loss using the expected proceeds E(Rm(s)|s) rather than expected firm
value E(v|s). To see this, note that the initial return may be expressed
rs =
Σ(s,m)v −E(Rm(s)|s)
E(Rm(s)|s)
,
which, if the probability of failure is (near) zero, may be expressed as
rs =
E(v|s)−E(Rm(s)|s)
E(Rm(s)|s)
In other words, the initial return as a measure of indirect cost of going public normalizes the
total expected loss E(v|s)−E(Rm(s)|s) by expected proceeds E(Rm(s)|s) rather than expected
firm value E(v|s). Since E(v|s) ≥ E(Rm(s)|s), the initial return thus over-estimates the loss
associated with the IPO. This is not a general implication, however. Allowing for a positive
probability of failure, the initial return may actually underestimate the loss associated with
the IPO. To see this, note that Σ(s,m)v ≤ E(v|s), which suggests that if the probability of
failure 1−Σ(s,m) is suﬃciently large, the expected initial return may underestimate the loss
associated with going public.
The initial return rs represents the expected amount of money left on the table Σ(s,m)(v−
V sm) normalized by the payment Σ(s,m)V sm. A higher initial return clearly implies more
money on the table for investors, but a higher initial return may be accompanied by greater
expected proceeds to the issuer and hence need not be associated with a higher cost of going
public.
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4 Discussion
4.1 Fixed-Price vs Bookbuilt
The setting studied in the present paper most closely resembles that of a fixed-price oﬀering.
However, the results apply to bookbuilt oﬀerings as well. Specifically, empirical evidence
shows that retail investors do receive allocations in bookbuilt IPOs even though they do not
participate in the bookbuilding process, and it shows that retail investors earn a positive
excess return on these allocations.11 The fact that retail investors do not participate in
the bookbuilding process, the positive excess return that they earn is hard to explain as a
compensation for revealing valuable information. Indeed, the fact that retail investors do not
participate in the bookbuilding process suggests that bookbuilt issues are fixed-price from
the viewpoint of retail investors, and hence that the positive excess return to retail investors
represents compensation for adverse selection, as suggested by the analysis of Benveniste
and Wilhelm (1990). The issuer must price the issue to induce suﬃcient demand from retail
investors to fill the retail tranche, which is essentially the problem studied in the present
paper.
If the bookbuilding process works as hypothesized, then the IPO price will reflect the
information observed by institutional investors (Benveniste and Spindt (1989); see Cornelli
and Goldreich (2001) for empirical support). Aggarwal et al. (2002), however, find that the
return to institutional investors is too large to be explained by bookbuilding alone, suggesting
that institutional investors are allocated underpriced issues at the expense of retail investors.
This evidence also suggests that institutional investors may not reveal fully reveal their in-
formation during the bookbuilding process and hence that there may be adverse selection
among institutional investors as well.
4.2 Empirical Evidence
The model shows that initial returns may be higher in issues preceded by favorable public
information than in issues preceded by unfavorable public information. This result is consis-
tent with the empirical evidence on partial adjustment of IPO prices to public information
11See Aggarwal, Prabbala, and Puri (2002) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) for evidence on allocations
across retail and institutional investors in bookbuilt oﬀers. With respect to returns, Aggarwal et al. document
a first day return of 13.9% to retail investors, and 15.7% to institutional investors. Although the return to
institutional investors is higher than that to retail investors, the return retail investors is clearly in excess of
any risk adjusted rate of return.
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(see Introduction). The present model accounts for this evidence as an optimal (and ratio-
nal) response by the issuer to publicly available information. Specifically, unfavorable public
information has the eﬀect of increasing diﬀerences in investors’ reservation values. This im-
plies an increase in investor heterogeneity, to which the issuer responds by floating the issue
to better-informed investors. The result is that the quality of the marginal investor will
be higher in issues preceded by unfavorable public information than in issues preceded by
favorable information, and hence that initial returns may be lower.
The main empirical implication of the Rock argument is that the excess return to unin-
formed bidding will be zero. This implication relies an assumption that the marginal investor
in the oﬀering is uninformed. Since uninformed investors presumably submit bids randomly
in IPOs, when the marginal investor is uninformed the bid strategy of the marginal investor
in the oﬀering is easily simulated with proper allocation data. As such, the assumption of an
uninformed marginal investor oﬀers a convenient benchmark. Indeed, if the marginal investor
is informed, as suggested by the present model, then the adverse selection argument implies
that the expected excess return to uninformed bidding will be negative. Furthermore, it
implies that the expected excess return to uninformed bidding will be lower the more precise
is the private information observed by the marginal investor. Also, holding the quality of the
marginal investor constant, the excess return to uninformed participation in issues preceded
by unfavorable information will be lower than that to uninformed participation in issues pre-
ceded by favorable information, since investor heterogeneity is higher in the first case. Both
factors pull towards a prediction that the return to uninformed participation is lower in is-
sues preceded by unfavorable public information than in issues preceded by favorable public
information.
These implications are consistent with the recent empirical evidence of Amihud et al., who
test the Rock prediction of a zero allocation-weighted excess return to uninformed investors in
a sample of IPOs from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. They find that an uninformed strategy
of submitting bids in all the IPOs in their sample would have yielded a negative excess return,
while a strategy of submitting bids only in IPOs preceded by favorable public information
would have yielded a zero excess return. With respect to the present model, their results
suggest that the marginal investor in issues preceded by favorable market information is
uninformed, and that the marginal investor in the case of unfavorable information is informed.
An alternative way of testing the model is through bid size. The prediction that the quality
of the marginal investor is higher in issues preceded by unfavorable public information than
in issues preceded by favorable public information implies that the quality range of bidders
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in issues preceded by favorable public information will be higher than in issues preceded by
unfavorable information. In the case of bookbuilt issues, these implications apply to the retail
tranche. If higher quality investors submit larger bids than do lower quality investors, then
the prediction on bidder quality implies that average bid size will be smaller in issues preceded
by unfavorable public information than in issues preceded by favorable public information.
However, investors are likely to adjust bid sizes according to the extent of rationing that they
expect, submitting larger bids in IPOs preceded by favorable public information. This makes
the relationship between bid size, bidder quality, and the public signal ambiguous. One way
around this ambiguity may be to consider the variability in bid size across bidder. If the
quality range of investors is higher in issues preceded by favorable public information, and
bid size is positively correlated with investor quality, then the present argument implies that
the variation in bid sizes will be higher in issues preceded by favorable public information
than in issues preceded by unfavorable public information.
5 Concluding Remarks
Empirical evidence shows that initial returns are higher in issues preceded by favorable public
information than in issues preceded by unfavorable public information, which suggests that
IPO prices are only partially adjusted to public information observed prior to the issue date.
The present paper develops an IPO model based on the adverse selection argument of Rock
(1986) that produces empirical predictions consistent with this evidence. Specifically, it shows
that favorable public information reduces the degree of heterogeneity among potential bidders
in the oﬀering, and that this induces the issuer to price the issue more conservatively when
the public signal is favorable in the sense of pricing it to induce investors with less precise
private signals to submit bids in it, and thereby increase the probability that the oﬀering
will succeed. The model thus predicts that the quality of the information observed by the
marginal investor will be lower–and hence initial returns may be higher–in issues preceded
by favorable information than in issues preceded by unfavorable information.
In the standard adverse selection argument the marginal investor is uninformed, which
implies that the expected excess return to uninformed participation in the IPO market must
be zero. The present paper, however, suggests that the marginal investor in the oﬀering will
be informed, and hence that the expected excess return to uninformed participation will be
negative. Furthermore, it shows that investor heterogeneity and the quality of the marginal
investor are both lower in issues preceded by favorable public information than in issues
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preceded by unfavorable information. As a result, the expected excess return to uninformed
participation will be less in issues preceded by unfavorable public information. These predic-
tions are consistent with recent evidence of Amihud et al. (2003), who document negative
excess returns to uninformed participation in issues preceded by unfavorable information and
a zero excess return in issues preceded by favorable public information.
Favorable public information increases the fundamental value of the firm, and it decreases
adverse selection costs. Both eﬀects increase expected proceeds, and so both eﬀects make
it more desirable for the firm to go public. Since the adverse selection cost is negatively
correlated with the public signal, the model implies that the number of firms that are coming
to the market in periods of favorable public information will be excessively large relative to
what may be predicted from fundamental values, and that the number of firms coming to
the market in periods of unfavorable public information will be excessively small. Such a
prediction is consistent with the observation of hot issue markets.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. If m = 1, the lemma is trivial. Consider the case for which m > 1,
and consider within the summation in
P
S1×···\{bm,...,bN} p(s1, . . . , sN ) from v
0 the element
p(. . . , gm−h, . . . , gm, . . . ) + p(. . . , bm−h, . . . , gm, . . . ),
where 1 ≤ h < m. Now, since
p(. . . , gm−h, . . . , sm, . . . ) + p(. . . , bm−h, . . . , sm, . . . ) = p(. . . , sm, . . . ) for all h ∈ Bc
it follows that
X
S1×···\{bm...,bN}
p(s1, . . . , sN , s) =
X
Sm×···\{bm,...,bN}
p(sm, . . . , sN , s)
where the summation on the right hand side is from v.
Consider then the summation
X
S1×···\{bm,...,bN}
p(s1, . . . , sN , s)v(s1, . . . , sN , s)
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and the element
p(. . . , gm−h, . . . , sm, . . . )v(. . . , gm−h, . . . , sm, . . . )
+p(. . . , bm−h, . . . , sm, . . . )v(. . . , bm−h, . . . , sm, . . . )
= p(. . . , sm, . . . )v(. . . , sm, . . . )
and thus
X
S1×···\{bm,...,bN}
p(s1, . . . , sN , s)v(s1, . . . , sN , s)
=
X
Sm×···\{bm,...,bN}
p(sm, . . . , sN , s)v(sm, . . . , sN , s)
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of uses an observation that the expected after-
market value of the firm may be expressed as a weighted average of the reservation values of
each investor in the set B, as follows
v = VmΣm + Vm+1Σm+1 + ...+ VNΣNΣm +Σm+1 + ...+ΣN
,
where the notation for the public signal s is suppressed throughout. This most easily seen in
the case where m = N − 1. The reservation values of investors N − 1 and N are given by
VN−1 =
p(bN |gN−1)v(gN−1, bN) + p(gN |gN−1)12v(gN−1, gN)
p(bN |gN−1) + 12p(gN |gN−1)
=
p(gN−1, bN)v(gN−1, bN) + p(gN−1, gN)12v(gN−1, gN)
p(gN−1, bN ) + 12p(gN−1, gN )
,
and
VN =
p(bN−1, gN )v(bN−1, gN ) + p(gN−1, gN)12v(gN−1, gN)
p(bN−1, gN) + 12p(gN−1, gN)
,
where VN ≥ VN−1 if γN ≥ γN−1. Further,
v = p(gN−1, bN )v(gN−1, bN ) + p(bN−1, gN )v(bN−1, gN ) + p(gN−1, gN)v(gN−1, gN )p(gN−1, bN ) + p(bN−1, gN ) + p(gN−1, gN)
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and thus
v = ΣN−1VN−1 +ΣNVNΣN−1 +ΣN
where
ΣN−1 = p(gN−1, bN ) +
1
2
p(gN−1, gN) and ΣN = p(bN−1, gN) +
1
2
p(gN−1, gN)
It is now immediate that VN−1 ≤ v and hence that the IPO is underpriced in equilibrium.
Extended to the general case, the expected aftermarket value of the firm may be expressed
as follows:
v = VmΣm + Vm+1Σm+1 + ...+ VNΣNΣm +Σm+1 + ...+ΣN
= VmΣ0m + · · ·+ VNΣ0N .
where Σ0n := ΣnΣm+Σm+1+...+ΣN . It is now immediate that v ≥ Vm and that hence the issue is
underpriced if Vm ≤ Vm+1 ≤ · · · ≤ VN . It is also immediate that v > Vm if Vn < Vn+1 for at
at least one n, n+ 1 ∈ B. Finally, it is clear that this result is independent of the realization
of the public signal.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the case in which m = N − 1. The diﬀerence
rbpre − rgpre is given by
rbpre − rgpre =
A
B × C
where
A := α(1−α)(2γP −1)(γN −γN−1)(1+γN−1(1−γN )+γN(1−γN−1))(γN +γN−1(1−γN )),
B := (1− α)(1− γP )(1− γN−1γN ) + αγP [γN(1− γN−1) + γN−1(1− γN )] + γN−1γNγP,
and
C : = αγN−1(1− γP ) + (1− α)γP + αγN(1− γN−1)
+γP (1− γN−1γN) + [2γN−1γN − αγP (1− γN−1)].
It is clear that A, B > 0. It is straightforward to show that [2γN−1γN −αγP (1− γN−1)] ≥ 0
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and hence that C > 0. Thus, rbpre − rgpre > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the case for which m(g) = m(b) = N − 1; if the
proposition is satisfied for in this case, then it is satisfied in the case for which the issuer
optimally chooses m(g) = N − 2 > m(b) = N − 1.12 Note that Mg(m) =Mb(m) if the public
signal is uninformative. The inequality will thus be satisfied if ∂Mg∂γ < 0 and
∂Mb
∂γ > 0. Taking
the derivatives gives:
∂Mg
∂γ =
−α(1− α)γN−1(2− γN)(γN − γN−1)(1 + γN−1 + γN − 2γN−1γN )
[(1− γ)(1− α)(γN−1γN − γN − 1) + (1− γ) + αγN−1(γγN − (1 + γ))]2
< 0,
and
∂Mb
∂γ =
α(1− α)γN−1(2− γN )(γN − γN−1)(1 + γN−1 + γN − 2γN−1γN)
[γ(1− α)(1 + γN(1− γN−1) + γN−1) + (1− γ)αγN−1(1− γN)]2
> 0.
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